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markets, thus protecting the public from injury and themselves from
suit.
Despite any criticisms levied at strict tort liability in cases such
as Lonzrick, the trend of the decisions indicates that the doctrine is
rapidly finding acceptance throughout the country, and it is doubtful that this trend will be halted. The Ohio courts now recognize
strict liability in actions for personal injury absent any express representations to the consumer and to the user, be he active or passive.8"
It appears that if the courts follow the route they have traveled in
abolishing the requirement of privity in actions based on express
warranty,8 4 the next step may well be to allow recovery, in the absence of privity, for pecuniary loss arising from a breach of implied
warranty.
STANLEY E. BLOCH

MORTGAGES -

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION -

LIEN AND PRIORITY
Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966).
The recent Massachusetts case of Guleserianv. Fields' appears to
be one of first impression in construing Massachusetts mortgage
law. As a result of that decision, a senior mortgagee may change
the amount of mortgage principal payments without prejudice to
his priority even though a junior mortgagee, who obtained his second mortgage subsequent to the first mortgage but prior to the
change, refused to give his consent to such change.2
The action arose when the mortgagors and the senior or first
mortgagee sought to change the first mortgage note payment terms
so that monthly principal payments due the first mortgagee within
the twenty-four month period following the agreement's execution
would be postponed until the maturity date of the mortgage, with
no increase in interest rate or principal.3 It is important to note that
the proposed change was not the usual extension of time beyond the
83 See id. at 227, 218 N.E.2d at 185; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
84 The court, in Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra note 83, took the first
step by eliminating privity in an action based on breach of express warranty for personal
injuries. Then in 1965, it abolished privity in an action based on express warranty for
pecuniary loss. Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583
(1965).
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maturity date. Rather, the first mortgagee was simply foregoing payment of the principal for two years, the amount unpaid to be added
to the balance due at maturity as a balloon payment.4
In resolving the issues involved, the court held, inter alia, that
such an extension or modification would neither affect nor diminish
the priority of the first mortgagee's security interest as it existed at
the time the second mortgage was executed.5 The court asserted:
The general rule is that a renewal or extension of an existing senior
mortgage and the note (or other obligation) secured thereby,
without an increase of the principal or interest payable with respect to the secured indebtedness, will not result in any loss of
priority of that senior mortgage over junior encumbrances. 6
In Massachusetts, such changes in the payments under mortgages are authorized by statute,7 and the very existence of this provision must be considered a warning to junior lienholders of the
possibility of such an extension.'
Moreover, in Fields, the junior mortgagee was warned of the
possibility of an extension not only by the statutory mortgage covenants but also by a special covenant between the mortgagor and the
first mortgagee included in the first mortgage.' It is this
special
1
opinion.
concurring
the
for
basis
the
forms
that
covenant
In concluding that the second mortgagee was not prejudiced and
was therefore not entitled to priority over the first mortgagee, the
court also stated that the junior mortgagee, being on notice of the
possibility of such an extension, could have easily guarded against
it." This point is indeed correct and perhaps, as suggested by the
concurring opinion, 2 would have been a better foundation for the
decision. However, the majority went to great lengths to establish
that the extension did not prejudice the junior mortgagee's position
1218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966).
2

Ibid.

Id. at 400. However, the interest payments were to continue even though the
principal payments were postponed.
3

4 Id. at 401.

5 Id. at 402.
6 Id. at 401. See, e.g., Crutchfield v. Johnson & Latimer, 243 Ala. 73, 8 So. 2d 412
(1942); State Life Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 308 Ill. App. 127, 31 N.E.2d 375 (1941);
1 JONEs, MORTGAGES § 438, at 560-61 (8th ed. 1928).
7 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 168, § 36 (1958).
8 Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Mass. 1966).
9 Id. at 399 n.2.
1l Id. at 403-05.
11 Id. at 402 n.6, 403.
12 ld. at 404.
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an argument which, from a practical point of view, is difficult
to accept. The court, in fact, does concede that the extension will
result in interest being "paid upon the amount of the postponed
principal payments for a longer period than was originally contemplated."'" In reality, this results in the mortgagor's increasing
his original burden by having to pay greater amounts of interest
than were originally contemplated by both the first and the second
mortgagee when the second mortgage was executed. Simple mathematics indicate that the more the mortgagor must pay the first mortgagee the less the mortgagor will have available for either working
capital or for payments to the second mortgagee. Thus, the possibility that the mortgagor will default is heightened and the risk
(prejudice) to the second mortgagee's security interest is increased.
-

Justice Spiegel, in his concurring opinion, detected this flaw in
the court's reasoning. Postponing payments of principal for a twoyear period, he noted, would result in a decrease of the second mortgagee's security.14 The reasoning is simple. Once such a postponement agreement goes into effect, "the unpaid principal balance at
any time thereafter" would be greater "than it would have been had
the payments been made as scheduled."' 5 The full impact of this
disadvantage would be felt if the mortgagor should eventually default in his principal payments. In such event, the second mortgagee "would be required to pay more than the amount it would
otherwise pay in order to be subrogated to the rights of the . . .
'
first mortgagee.'
Assuming prejudice, perhaps a reallocation of priorities would
be appropriate so that the junior mortgagee, in the event of a subsequent default by the mortgagor and foreclosure by the first mortgagee, would have first priority, at least to the extent that he has
been prejudiced by the extension agreement.
Is Id. at 401.
14 Id. at 403-04.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid. This very point was also strongly argued by the defendant (second mortgagee) in his brief, but to no avail:
A waiver of payments on the prior mortgage for any period necessarily
adversely impairs the position of the second mortgagee. The holder of a
second mortgage has the right to protect himself by becoming subrogated to
the position of the first mortgagee on payment of the mortgage indebtedness.
The effect of a waiver of payments for a period of time would be to increase
the payment which the holder of the second mortgage would have to pay to
protect himself in the event of default or to be subrogated to the first mortgagee's position. Brief for Defendant, p. 6, Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d
397 (Mass. 1966).
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There are decisions, though factually distinguishable, which have
attempted to protect the junior mortgagee when his interests were
seriously prejudiced. 7 The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, has
taken the position that an extension of the maturity date without
the knowledge and consent of the second mortgagee would prejudice his security interest. 8
In the past, some junior mortgagees have unsuccessfully argued
that their position is analogous to that of a surety who is not bound
by any extension granted to the creditor without the surety's consent. 9 The first mortgagee in the Fields case answered this possibility by saying that such a principle is "untenable" as well as being
unsupported by case law.2" The first mortgagee's brief pointed out
that the second mortgagee has no real legal connection with the
first mortgage, nor does he, like a surety, guarantee the mortgagor's
performance of the first mortgage. Hence, the second mortgagee
cannot in any real sense be considered a surety.2
Research has failed to disclose an Ohio case factually on point
in every respect with Fields, but the overall case law is sufficient to
provide a rather accurate indication of how such an action might be
resolved.
The appropriate Ohio statutes are by no means as numerous or
complex as those considered in the principal case. The Ohio statutory mortgage condition 22 does not contain a reference to "any ex17
E.g., Wheeler v. Menold, 81 Iowa 647, 47 N.W. 871 (1891); Bunker v. Barron,
93 Me. 87, 44 At. 372 (1899); Pettis v. Darling, 57 Vt. 647 (1885).
Is Wheeler v. Menold, supra note 17, at 649, 47 N.W. at 872. In this case the junior
mortgagee was permitted to redeem the prior mortgage and foreclose because the mortgagor's failure to pay was in violation of the requirements of the senior mortgage.
The court's reasoning could easily apply to the principal case. The junior mortgagee,
argued the court, could protect himself in only one way - by inspecting the record before giving the second mortgage to determine what encumbrances were outstanding and
their maturity dates. Based on this information the junior mortgagee could then intelligently determine the risks involved and whether he was willing to take them. The
court therefore refused to permit any change that would result in prejudice to the subsequent encumbrance, stating that the junior mortgagee would be prejudiced because
he would be "delayed in the foreclosing of his mortgage, and the redemption under it,
while the security is being consumed by the accumulation of interest on ... the senior
mortgage." Id. at 648-49, 47 N.W. at 872. See Brockton Say. Bank v. Shapiro, 324
Mass. 678, 88 N.E.2d 344 (1949); Empire Trust Co. v. Park-Lexington Corp., 243 App.
Div. 315, 276 N.Y. Supp. 586 (1934).
9Miami Real Estate Co. v. Baxter, 98 Fla. 900, 124 So. 452 (1929); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Hildebrandt, 221 Wis. 394, 267 N.W. 42 (1936).
20 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 16, Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966).
21 Ibid.
22
OHio REV. CODE § 5302.14.
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tension" of the mortgage, as does the Massachusetts statute.23 The
record, therefore, would give no notice of the possibility of an extension to a subsequent mortgagee unless the mortgagor and the prior
mortgagee had themselves so agreed to the possibility and had
included such a statement in the mortgage terms themselves.
Furthermore, Ohio does not have a statute similar to Massachusetts ' authorizing mortgagee savings banks to make subsequent
changes in the amount of periodic mortgage payments. This Massachusetts statutory provision is the equivalent of notice to the subsequent mortgagee "that the holder of a savings bank mortgage may
wish to extend the debt,"25 and the bank, under this statute, is authorized to grant the extension.2" It was not dear from the face of
the statute precisely how this would affect subsequent mortgagees,
but both parties in the principal case stipulated that the practice
had been to grant such changes or extensions "without checking for
the existence or seeking the assent of junior lienors on the mortgaged property.""
In Ohio, therefore, it would seem that the question of notice
would be a key factor in determining priorities and whether a subsequent mortgagee will be unduly prejudiced by permitting such a
change.2 8 Although a case similar to the principal case would probably result in the same decision if tried in Ohio, the court would
very likely adopt the view of the concurring opinion which favors a
notice test to determine if there has been prejudice to the subsequent
23

MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 183, § 20 (1958).

24

MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 168, § 36 (1958).

25

Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Mass. 1966).
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 402 n.7.
28
In Riegel v. Belt, 119 Ohio St. 369, 164 N.E. 347 (1928), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that the priority of an unrecorded prior mortgage, expressly referred to in a
junior mortgage, would not be affected by renewal of the prior mortgage subsequent to
execution and delivery of the junior mortgage. It was noted that such a renewal would
in no way result in prejudice to the junior mortgagee.
In Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonnel, 35 Ohio St. 365 (1880), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a new agreement, within the contemplation of an original mortgage
condition, will modify the original mortgage condition just as if the new terms were incorporated into the original condition. This would indicate that a modification may be
freely made when the original terms give fair notice of such possibility.
Section 5301.231 of the Ohio Revised Code might, at first blush, appear to be directly in point: "All amendment or supplements of mortgages, or modifications or extensions of mortgages.. . shall... take effect from the time they are delivered ... for
record." However, although this recording statute clearly relates to the validity of such
a modification or extension, it would not seem intended to abrogate the general rule that
a modification of a senior mortgage without prejudice to the junior mortgage does not
affect the priority of the senior mortgage.
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mortgagee," rather than the view that there is simply no prejudice
as a matter of law."s
The question still remains as to what the junior mortgagee might
do to protect his investment. It was suggested that the junior mortgagee could have included a clause in the second mortgage prohibiting modification of previous mortgage payment terms, thus avoiding
the result in this case."' Had he done so, any extension or postponement in the principal installment payments on the first mortgage note would constitute a breach of the second mortgage thereby
entitling the second mortgagee to foreclose."
Although this statement does not carry the weight of a "holding," it would appear to
be a rather positive indication of the future path of the law in this
area.
The Fields case establishes that in Massachusetts a modification
of the type herein discussed, even without the second mortgagee's
consent, does not affect the senior mortgagee's priority.3 Second
or junior mortgagees, at least in Massachusetts, would do well to
heed the court's advice regarding the avoidance of similar situa4
tions.3
DAVID

L. ROSENZWEIG

29 See Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397, 403-05 (Mass. 1966) (concurring
opinion).
30 See Guleserian v. Fields, supra note 29. Of course, this is not an ideal solution
since such a clause, if violated, would only result in a default, and not in a change of
priorities. Perhaps its best effect would be to deter the mortgagor and first mortgagee
from making such a modification without the second mortgagee's consent.
31 Id. at 403 (dictum).
32 The court stated that the second mortgagee could perhaps
have included in the second mortgage an express condition that the mortgagors must continue, without any extension or postponement, to make the installment payments of principal on the first mortgage note. If such a provision
had been made, postponement of any such payments by the proposed extension
agreement would constitute, we assume, a breach of such a special condition of
the second mortgage. Ibid.
33 Id. at 402.
34
Id.at 403.

